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LEGISLATION
UNIFORM BANK COLLECTION LAWS-It is a commonplace that the modem
world of business revolves largely around a system of credits rather than actual
cash transactions. Equally well known is the fact that this development has
been paralleled by a weltering mass of conflicting decisions and statutes regu-
lating this system of credits. A discussion of the need for uniformity would
now be superfluous. But the fact that the widespread realization of this need
has already given rise to two concrete suggestions-the Bank Collection Code '
and the Uniform Bank Collection Act 2-- as to the form which that uniformity
shall take, makes it necessary to review the relationships arising out of the
collection of commercial paper and to determine the effect of the proposed legis-
lation upon the resultant legal incidents.
When commercial paper is deposited in a bank it usually creates one of
two relationships between the depositor and the bank, depending upon the pur-
pose for which it is deposited. If the transaction between the customer and
the bank is a sale, it creates the relation of debtor and creditor; if deposited
for collection, the relation of principal and agent results. It is usually said
that in the latter case there is also a trust in the paper until it is collected.'
Therefore, if the bank becomes insolvent, the depositor can reclaim the instru-
ment.4 Of course, in the case of a sale, the depositor no longer has any rights
in the instrument, but is merely a general creditor of the bank in respect to the
credit received in exchange., While it is relatively easy to outline the resulting
incidents when the nature of the transaction has been established, such deter-
mination itself, however, often proves difficult. An important indicium em-
ployed by the courts in this respect is the manner in which the paper is en-
dorsed.6  If the indorsement is restrictive-that is, one "which constitutes the
indorsee the agent of the indorser, or vests title in the indotsee in trust for or
to the use of some other person" 7 -the relationship is one of agency. If the
indorsement is non-restrictive, whether special or in blank, then whether the
instrument has been discounted by the bank is an important consideration.'
Again, the difficult problem is not the nature of the incidents arising out of the
type, but the determination of what 'type the particular indorsement is. At
common law, there was much diversity of opinion as to the nature of such in-
'Hereinafter referred to as the "Code". It is sponsored by the American Bankers' Asso-
ciation and has been adopted in the following eighteen states: Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 432, 433, n. 8.
1 Hereinafter referred to as the "Act." It has been proposed by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. See Third Tentative Draft in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF COMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1931) 256. No
changes were made at the 1932 Conference.
'Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover State Bank, 3o9 Kan. 772, 204 Pac. 992
(1922) ; Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd., v. Browne, 69 Mont. 34o, 220 Pac. 1114 (923);
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Peters, 139 Va 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924).
'Corn Exchange Bank v. Blye, io N. Y. 303, 4 N E. 635 (1886); United States
National Bank v. Geer, 55 Neb. 462, 75 N. W. lo88 (I898) SELovEa, BANK CoLLECTIoNS
(190) 3.
' Goshorn v. Murray, 23o Fed. 88o (C. C. A. 3d, 1914), Doppelt v National Bank of
Republic, 175 Ill. 432, 5i N. E. 753 (i898) Cody v City National Bank of Grand Rapids, 55
Mich. 379, 2x N. W. 373 (1884).
'Baker, Bank Deposits and Collections, ii MicH. L. Rav. 232. 216, 224 (913)
7 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 36.
8Baker, supra note 6, at 222.
(201)
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dorsements as "for deposit",9 and "pay any bank or banker". 10 This situation
has not been clarified by the proposed legislation, the Code " making them
restrictive, and the Act, 12 non-restrictive. It would seem, on analysis, that in
such cases it is obvious that the purpose of the indorser is to manifest an
intention to retain title in himself, thus bringing it within the definition of a
restrictive indorsement as contained in the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Further, sound policy should dictate that any doubts be resolved in favor of
considering the indorsement restrictive. The depositor would thereby be pro-
tected, since upon the bank's insolvency he could reclaim the item, if still uncol-
lected, from either the bankrupt bank or its transferee.' Nor does such con-
struction affect adversely the interests of the bank, the point becoming material
only in case of the bank's insolvency. To the extent that any credit extended
has been drawn upon, the bank automatically has a lien and as to this the general
creditors, upon insolvency, are entitled to their pro rata share; but as to the
balance there is no reason why they should participate since the bank's assets
have not in any respect been dissipated on account thereof. No matter which
construction is given, it cannot be denied that unanimity as to the effect of any
particular indorsement is highly desirable.
Assuming that the paper has been deposited for collection and that there-
fore an agency relation exists, it next becomes important to determine the rela-
tion between the owner of the item and any correspondent bank to which the
first bank has forwarded the paper for collection. Under the New York rule
the bank of deposit, by selecting the correspondent bank, makes the latter its
agent for the purpose of fulfilling the duty it has assumed to the customer,
namely the collection of the paper.'4  On the other hand, the Massachusetts
rule considers the correspondent bank the agent of the customer, on the theory
that the customer, realizing that the bank of deposit would not personally col-
lect the paper, impliedly authorized the selection of a correspondent bank.' 5 It
seems artificial, however, to suppose what the depositor's intent is and then
formulate the rule of law accordingly. It may safely be said that in the or-
dinary situation the depositor lacks a definite intent.1 6 Therefore, a more in-
telligent approach to the problem would be to disregard the bases of the two
rules and to adopt that one which in practice shows itself to be the most con-
venient and suitable for our purposes.
'For cases holding the indorsement restrictive see: Midwest National Bank & Trust Co.
v. Niles & Watters Savings Bank, i9o Iowa 752, i8o N. W. 88o (19I2) ; First National Bank
v. Morrell, 53 S. D. 496, 221 N. W. 95 (1928); National Bank v. Lumber Co., io7 N. J. L.
492, I55 Atl. 762 ('93').
The indorsement has also been held non-restrictive: Security Bank v. Northwestern
Fuel Co., 58 Minn. I4i, 59 N. W. 987 (1894); American Trust Co. v. Gueder Mfg. Co., i5o
Ill. 336, 37 N. E. 27 (x894) ; Morris v. First Nat. Bank, 201 Pa. i6o, 5o Atl. iooo (1902).
"That "pay any bank or banker" is restrictive, see: Citizens' Trust Co. v. Ward, 195
Mo. App 223, 190 S. W. 364 (igi6); People's & Drovers' Bank v. Craig, 63 Ohio St. 374,
59 N. E. ioz (I9OO) ; First Nat. Bank v. Weitzel, 239 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
The indorsement has often been held non-restrictive: Nat. Bank v. Bossemeyer, 1oI Neb.
96, 162 N. W. 5o3 (1917) ; Interstate Trust Co. v. National Bank, 67 Colo. 6, i85 Pac. 260
(I919) ; Sands v. Parker, 153 Tenn. 664, 284 S. W. 902 (1926).
S§ 4.
"§ 2.
See supra note 4.
4Allen v. Merchants Bank, 22 Wend. 215 (N. Y. 1839) ; Gilpin v. Columbia Nat. Bank,
22o N. Y. 406, 115 N. E. 982 (1917) ; Hoover v. Wise, 91 U S. 308 (875). See also Note
(1924) 12 CALIF. L. REV. 209 at 211. Pierson, Legislation Relating to Problems of Check
Collection (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 406.
is Moas-, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 25o; MAGEE, BANKS AND BANKING
(3d ed. 1921) §2W6.
6 (1901) 14 HA~v. L. REV. 384.
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Where the paper is still uncollected, no problem is presented, since under
either view, it may be reclaimed by the customer. Where collected, and the
correspondent bank becomes insolvent before remitting the proceeds to the bank
of deposit, the New York rule permits the customer to recover in full from
the 'ank of deposit. 17  Under the Massachusetts rule, however, the bank of
deposit is not responsible for the continued solvency of its correspondent, and
the customer has only a general claim against the defunct correspondent. 8 On
the other hand, if at a point after collection and before remittance, the bank of
deposit becomes insolvent, the customer can recover in full from the corre-
spondent under the Massachusetts view,' 9 but is only a general creditor of the
bank of deposit under the New York view.2 0  The situation then, under this
latter rule, is one in which the bank of deposit is unfairly saddled with the
burden of any loss arising out of the correspondent's insolvency. On the other
hand, if the bank of deposit becomes insolvent, its general creditors are unjustly
enriched to the extent of the proceeds in the hands of the correspondents, since
such proceeds would never have formed part of the insolvent bank's assets
were it not for the collection process. It would seem rational to avoid both
these results and have the financial status of the bank of deposit affected as
little as possible by the part it plays in the collection of the instruments; and
this is accomplished by the Massachusetts rule. A realization of the ad-
vantages of the Massachusetts rule soon led bankers in jurisdictions which fol-
lowed the New York rule to secure by contract with depositors, the results
obtaining under the Massachusetts rule.2 ' To the same effect were regulations
adopted by the Federal Reserve Board for member banks.
2 2  It is significant
that this is the view adopted by both the Code 2" and the Act.'
4
The one objection to the Massachusetts rule is that it fails to protect the
customer where the correspondent bank fails before remittance. This difficulty
can be met by establishing in the assets of the defunct bank a preference in
favor of the customer. As already indicated, the common law allowed the
depositor merely a general claim.2' The reason usually assigned for refusing
a preference was that no trust or similar relation was ever contemplated so far
as the proceeds were concerned.' 6 Of late, however, the courts found such an
intention more frequently; and accordingly, allowed preferences on this basis.' 7
But even where such preference was allowed, its practical importance was con-
siderably diminished by requiring the depositor to trace the actual proceeds re-
ceived in payment of the item.2  To remedy this situation statutes were passed
'1 See stpra note 14.
Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, go Atl. 369 (1914) ; Smith & Co. v.
Montgomery, 209 Ala. ioo, 95 So. 29o (1923) ; Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 2z
Mass. 181, 136 N. E. 333 (19z). See also Note (1928) 14 VA. L. REv. 473, 476.
Supra note 15.
Supra note 14.
See Pierson, supra note 14, at 4o6. HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws AND PROCEEDINGS (1929) 249.
FEDRAL REsERvE REGULATION J. (928) § 5.
§ 2.
4§42.
" See supra note i8.
2Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Clayton, 56 Fed. 759 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893) ; Gonyer
v. Williams, i68 Cal. 452, 143 Pac. 736 (914) ; Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra
note I8. See also Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection Itenw, and Trust Preferences (193I) 29
MIcE. L. REV. 545, 548.
Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. U. S. Steel Products Co., 29o Fed. 884 (C. C. A. 9th,
1923) ; Skinner v. Porter, 45 Idaho 530, 263 Pac. 993 (1928) ; Bogert, supra note 26, at 550.
(See n. ii for cases).
"Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. U. S. Steel Products Co., supra note 27; Skinner v.
Porter, supra note 27; Sabine Canal Co. v. Crowley Trust & Savings Bank, 164 La. 33, 113
So. 754 (1927).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
in several states 29 eliminating the need of tracing in such a case. Both the
Code so and the Act "1 have included similar provisions. Although some writers
have deplored so radical a departure from old and long established concepts, 82
it cannot be doubted that the complexity of the bank collection system makes
such a step imperative,'2 for otherwise the depositor is left completely unpro-
tected. Since the drawer has been discharged by the payment of the item, 4
the contest is purely between the owner of the item and the general creditors
of the defunct bank. The establishment of a preference, of course, diminishes
the assets available to the general creditors, and it has been argued that since
they have not received any benefit from the transaction involving the item, they
should not be penalized with losses resulting from the collection process. 5 But
closer analysis reveals that this is not an unjust discrimination against the
general creditors since the proceeds of the collected item would not otherwise
have formed part of the assets of the defunct bank.36 In other words, here, as
above, in the case of the bank of deposit, it seems advisable to separate the
business of collection from the routine business of the bank, and to hold that
the proceeds of one have no connection with the proceeds of the other. It is
then evident that the creation of a preference in favor of the customer does not
in fact diminish the assets available for the claims of the general creditors,
since the preference is satisfied out of funds which have no real connection
with the funds to which the creditors would normally look for satisfaction.
The practicality of such a view is emphasized by a comparison of the benefit
that each individual creditor would receive from a pro rata distribution of the
proceeds as compared with the importance to the customer of being granted a
preference.
It has been suggested that the risk of loss be in some way placed on the
whole commercial-paper-using class, but even the exponent of this idea realized
the administrative difficulties in the way of such a plan. 7  Nor would a form
'Colo. Laws 1925, c. 63; La. Laws 1926, 78; N. C. Laws 1927, 356; S. C. Laws 1927,
p. 369; Utah Laws 1927, c. 49.
o§13 (3).
=§31.
= See Bogert, supra note 26, at 559. "The trust institution has long been based on the
theory of the necessity of a specific equitable interest in a specific thing as a basis for its
existence. To establish a rule by decision or statute that a trust can exist without definite
subject matter, or to create fictions about subject matter and state that it exists where in fact
it does not, is vicious in that it makes the law uncertain and contradictory."
' See Townsend, Constructive Trusts and Bank Collections (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 980,
1012. In Note (I927) 36 YALE L. J. 682 at page 687, it was said that the trust doctrine,
requiring tracing, limits or restricts preferences. It is, therefore, for purposes of commercial
paper, inadequate as applied.
'Certainly a payment by the drawee to the correspondent constitutes a payment in due
course which discharges the instrument. NEOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § II9(1).
I See Bogert, supra note 26, at 563; Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 432, 434.
"OTurner, Bank Collectios-The Direct Routing Practice (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 468 at
487: ". . .. had the item been presented to the drawee through the local clearing house
and paid, the amount would have been. irrevocably separated from the assets of the failed
bank. This would not be regarded as in any sense inequitable to the depositors. When,
for reasons of general efficiency, this additional collection step is eliminated, and the payment
is received by the drawee for direct remittance, the general creditors are in no worse position
if a preferred claim is given the forwarder."
"Deeming the collecting banks as agents, the general depositors are not in any way
injured by allowing a preferred claim since in no real sense did the estate ever receive the
item or its proceeds as part of its general assets." HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (931) P. 254.
"Bogert, supra note 26, at 565.
LEGISLATION
of insurance similar to that employed in the Guaranty Deposit System 8  be
expedient. Experience has taught that such a form of insurance is worthless
during times of financial crisis when security is most needed.
While both the Code and the Act allow such a preference, the Code unre-
strirtedly permits its enforcement against any assets, 39 while the Act excludes
fixed assets.40 The underlying theory is that the fixed assets cannot properly
be considered to have come to the insolvent bank as a result of the paper re-
ceived through the collection system,41 and therefore should not be subjected
to a liability arising out of a collection. This accords with the distinction sug-
gested above-that there is some line which separates the collection business
from the routine business.
A third situation arises where the item has been surrendered to the drawee
bank which then fails without having made payment. If the item had been
charged against the account of the drawer the usual common law rule dis-
charged the drawer and gave the owner of the paper only a general claim
against the insolvent drawee.42  Here again, the Code and Act provide for a
preference in favor of the owner.43  This cannot be defended on the ground
that to deny a preference would result in unjust enrichment to the general
creditors by analogy to the situations discussed above relative to a defunct bank
of deposit or correspondent bank. Here we are unable to argue that the assets
have been augmented as a result of the collection system. Therefore, to allow
a preference is in fact to reduce the fund on which general creditors have a right
to rely for security.
It should be noted that such a preference under the Act is not given where
the drawee has not yet charged the drawer's account; in which case the owner's
action is restricted to the drawer and other parties secondarily liable, and then
only if due notice of dishonor has been given.
44  A provision in the Act 4
excuses any delay or omission on the part of the closed bank in returning the
item to the owner and in giving notice to secondary parties. But this relates
only to the bank and cannot be construed to continue the liability of secondary
parties who, under the Negotiable Instruments Law, would be discharged by
lack of notice of dishonor.46 The only effect of this provision then is to deprive
the owner of the item of an action against the defunct bank for failure to give
notice; but such right is of doubtful value anyway, since the owner would share
only as a general creditor. If the framers intended deeper implications, the
section should certainly be rephrased.
'A certain percentage of the bank's deposits was paid into a central fund as a form of
insurance in case of the bank's failure. But oftentimes the costs of such a system of insurance
exceeded the bank's earning power; the protection it gave was inadequate, and during finan-
cial crises, there was seldom a sufficiently large fund to adequately ptotect the depositors.
See Butts, Guaranty of Bank Deposits in Eight States (1931) 3 Miss. L. J. 186 for excellent
discussion on this subject.
' See § 13 of the Code.
' See § 31 of the Act.
"See Turner, stupra note 36, at 488; Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 432; HAMBooK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS
(931) p. 254.
' Seventh Nat'l Bank v. Cook, 73 Pa. 483 (1873); Pratt v. Foote, 9 N. Y. 463 (1854);
State v. Cox, 325 Mo. 938, 30 S. W. (2d) 46 (1936); Planter's Mercantile Co. v. Armour
Packing Co., 109 Miss. 47o, 69 So. 293 (i915). See also Note (i93i) 40 YALE L. J. 802, 807;
Note (Iq29) 8 N. C. L. REv. 55, 56; Wallace, Comments on the Proposed Uniform Check Col-
lection Code (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 792, 807; i MoRsE, op. cit. supra note I5, § 410. See § 7
of the Code and § 8 of the Act.
See mpra notes 3o and 31.
"NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 89.
§ 50. The Code contains no similar provision on this matter.
Supra note 44.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
We must now consider the manner in which the drawee received the item-
that is, whether by mail or over the counter. The practice of transmitting
items deposited for collection directly to the drawee bank has long been frowned
upon by the courts as being negligent.4 7  But during the past decade or two,
direct routing has been more firmly established by means of contractual arrange-
ments between bank and depositor 48 and also by statutes. 49  Although both
the Code " and the Act 5 ' sanction this practice, the attendant disadvantages
are too significant to be overlooked. To use the traditional language, it is said
that this constitutes the drawee bank agent to collect from itself,5 2 and that the
natural tendency to delay enforcing against one's self the claim of another
renders the drawee bank unsuited for this purpose.13  Analysis discloses that
such practice does in fact tend to defeat the interest of the depositor of the item.
For instance, the drawee may delay in making payment. Meanwhile, its assets
are being diminished by payment of other obligations either over the counter or
through the clearing house, and the chance is not too remote that insolvency
may intervene before the item sent by mail is paid. In such case, if the drawer's
account has been debited with the amount of the item, the instrument is con-
sidered paid 11 and the drawer is accordingly discharged under the Negotiable
Instruments Law.'5  And where the drawer's account has not been debited,
the unreasonable delay in acting upon the item constitutes a dishonor; 51 and
since it can hardly be expected that the drawee will give notice of its own dis-
honor, the drawer is discharged for this reason.57 In either case, therefore,
the owner's only remedy is recourse as a general creditor against the defunct
drawee. If, however, there had been a personal presentment by a correspondent
the item would have been either paid, or, if payment were refused, immediate
notice of dishonor would be given to parties secondarily liable whose liability
would therefore continue.
'4 Western Wheeled Scraper Co. v. Sadilek, 5o Neb. iO5, 69 N. W. 765 (1897) ; Ander-
son v. Rodgers, 53 Kan. 542, 36 Pac. 1O67 (1894). See also Pierson, supra note 14, at 407;
Turner, supra note 36, at 471; I MORSE, op. cit. supra note 15, § 236.
In England and New York a contrary rule has been stated. Heywood v. Pickering,
L. R. 9 Q. B. 428 (1874) ; Indig v. Nat. City Bank, 8o N. Y. Ioo (i88o). The New York
case, however, has since been overruled or at least has been strictly limited to its facts. See
National Revere Bank v. National Bank of the Republic, 172 N. Y. 1O2, lo8, 64 N. E. 799,
8oi (19o2).
' Such stipulations were usually printed in the depositor's pass book. Turner, supra
note 36, at 472; Pierson, supra note 14, at 407.
" Following the passage of FEDERAL RESERVE BoARD REGULATION J. (1924) authorizing
Federal Reserve Banks to send items directly to the drawee banks, statutes were passed in
various states also permitting this practice. Ark. Laws 1921, No. 496; Cal. Stats. 1925, 5,3;
Colo. Laws 1923 c. 64; Ky. Acts 19o4, 8o; Minn. Laws 1919 c. 319; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate,
1921) §61o8; Ore. Laws 192o § 6217; Va. Laws 1924, n. 502; Vt. Laws 1896, No. 38; Wyo.
Laws 1923 c. 84.
§6 (a).
§4o.
Bank of Rocky Mount v. Floyd, 142 N. C. 187, 55 S. E. 95 (19o6) ; I MoRSE, op. cit.
supra note 15, at §236; MAGE, op. cit. supra note 15, at §282; Turner, supra note 36, at
473; Note (1928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 744, 745; 1 DANuIE, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed.
1913) § 328a.
' In Bank of Rocky Mount v. Floyd, upra note 52, the Court said at 193, 55 S. E. at
97: "How can the debtor be the proper agent of the creditor in the very matter of collecting
the debt? His interests are all adverse to those of his principal. If the debtor is embarrassed
there is the temptation to delay."
Supra note 42.
NEoTIABLmE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 120 (1).
"The instrument is dishonored by nonpayment when it is duly presented for payment
and payment is refused or can not be obtained." NEGOTIABLE INSTRIEMENTs LAW § 83 (I).
NEO rALE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 89.
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It is argued that the Code and Act nullify the evils of direct routing by
giving the owner a preference in the assets of the drawee. But this is true
only where the drawer's account has been charged; there is no such preference
where the drawee bank fails without having acted in any way to pay the paper."s
Nor would the situation be remedied by an amendment to provide for a prefer-
ence even where the drawer's account has not been charged so long as the
account is sufficient to cover the item. It might easily occur that several items
drawn on the same account would be received by the drawee at the same time.
The interesting question then arises as to which if any is to be preferred.
The supporters of direct routing contend that the risk is no less great where
a bank other than the drawee is selected as agent to collect-that it is just as
likely to collect and then fail before remitting as is the drawee. 9 It has
already been shown that the owner is fully protected under the Code and Act
by a preference in the assets of the correspondent who fails after collecting
but before remitting; but in the situation where the drawee fails after receiving
the item but before the drawer is debited, the owner may be left unprotected
under the system of direct routing, which would not be true if presented by
a correspondent bank. It is wrong, therefore, to speak of the risks as equal.
Possibly the principal advantage of direct routing is that it expedites the
collection process.10 It is true that it probably takes a day or two longer to
collect the item through a correspondent than to send it directly to the drawee.6'
But this can hardly be said to be so inconvenient as to outweigh the safeguards
of collection through a correspondent bank. The argument that the delay
entails interest losses of magnitude 0 2 is similarly answered by a comparison
between the almost negligible loss to each owner and the comparative security
accorded to him.
Analogous to the growth of direct routing and in proportion to the -modern
use of credits is the increasing tendency " to accept something other than cash
in payment of the item. Undoubtedly, conditions of today require a more facile
method of making payment than transmission of actual cash.68 Here again, as
in the case of direct routing, the antagonism of the common law has been cir-
cumvented by the agreements between customers and banks,65 legislative enact-
' See supra notes 3o and 31.
" Wallace, supra note 42, at 8oo.
' Turner, supra note 36.
1 Id. at 473 n. 29.
Ibid.
". .. it would be impossible to handle the volume of collections required to transact
modem business if only money could be used in transmission." Turner, supra note 36, at 483.
' Courts have usually held, in absence of stipulation or contractual arrangements or of
legislation to the contrary, that it was negligent for a bank receiving a check or note for col-
lection to accept anything other than cash. Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447 (U. S. 1868) ; Fed-
eral Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. i6o, 44 Sup. Ct. 296 (1924) ; Fifth Nat. Bank v.
Ashworth, 123 Pa. 212, i6 Atl. 596 (1889). See also Pierson, supra note 14, at 408; Note
(1931) 40 YALE L. J. 8o2.
A minority line of decisions held that the remittance draft was merely conditional pay-
ment; and since the holder retained his right against the drawer, acceptance of the draft as
payment was not negligence. Graham v. Warehouse, i89 N. C. 533, x7 S. E. 540 (925);
Lake Charles Feed Co. v. Sabatier, 12 La. App. 89, 125 So. 3X8 (1929).
The majority view arose undoubtedly from the rule that an agent is liable to his principal
for accepting anything other than money in payment of a check. i MECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed.
1924) § 946. This rule was said to apply to collecting banks as well. Federal Reserve Bank
v. Malloy, supra. In the latter case, the Court held that a Federal Reserve Regulation per-
mitting Federal Reserve Banks to practice direct routing did not impliedly authorize the
acceptance of a remittance draft in payment.
§ 74 of the NEaoriABLE INSTRUmEN'rs LAW, too, might be construed as requiring only
the payment of cash and surrender of the instrument. See Turner, supra note 36, at 478.
c Pierson, supra note 14, at 4o8; Turner, supra note 36, at 483.
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ments,66 and its sanction by both the Code 6 7 and the Act." It is undoubtedly
the rule that the medium of payment does not prevent the discharge of the
drawer; 69 therefore, if the drawee pays with a remittance draft and fails before
such draft is paid, the owner has only his claim against the defunct bank unless
a preference is allowed, as it is under both Act and Code.
Both the enactments provide that payment may be made by entering an
unconditional credit in the books of one bank in favor of another."0 It has
been contended that such credit is mere bookkeeping; that where the drawee
fails before such credit is drawn upon, it should be treated as still holding the
proceeds and consequently the owner's action must be against the drawee rather
than against the correspondent. 71  This argument fails to realize that uncondi-
tional credit is payment only when it is requested or authorized by the bank to
whom payment is made.7 1 Such bank, therefore, voluntarily assumes the risk
of the continued responsibility of the paying bank in respect to these credits
and should bear any loss incident thereto.
Where the rights of the parties are conditioned by the fact of payment it
sometimes becomes important to determine just when payment of the paper
takes place. The tendency is to consider that this happens as soon as possible,"
but for purposes of convenience and certainty an act sufficient to constitute
payment should be definite and one reasonably capable of being established as
a fact.7 4  Earlier cases were in great conflict, some selecting the moment of
charging the drawer's account,75 others upon the crediting of the collecting
bank7 6 or upon the mailing of a remittance draft.77  It is obvious that the
earlier the point at which payment is deemed made, the smaller is the depositor's
risk of loss arising out of such situations as the death of the drawer, or stop
order, or attachment made on the drawer's account.78  The Code 79 provides
that in the case of a solvent drawee, payment occurs when the amount is finally
charged to the account of the maker or drawer. By negative inference it has
been argued that payment cannot take place at an earlier time.80 To thus limit
the number of possibilities when payment may occur seems to handicap the
The following states, prior to the drafting of the Bank Collection Code, permitted by
statute the acceptance of remittance drafts in lieu of currency: Cal. Stats. 1925, c. 312, § 5;
Colo. Laws r923, c. 64; Mont. Laws 1925, c. 65; Ore. Laws 192o, § 6217; S. C. Acts I927,
No. 202; S. D. Laws I923, c. 31; Tenn. Acts 1921, c. 37.' See §9.
I See§ 41.
"'Anderson v. Gill, 79 Md. 312, 29 Atl. 527 (1894) ; Noble v. Doughton, 72 Kan. 336,
83 Pac. 048 (i9o5) ; see also Note (1929) 4 WAsH. L. RFv. 39, 40.
See § 9 of the Code and §§ 39 and 41 of the Act.
"See Turner, supra note 36, at 482.
Crediting is not deemed payment between banks unless it is accompanied by some un-
derstanding or agreement that it shall be so considered. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Rochling,
275 U. S. 248, 48 Sup. Ct. 58 (1927); Commercial Nat. Bank v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 42
Fed. 88o (C. C. Ind. i89o). See also i MORSE, op. cit. supra note 15, at § 250 p. 612.
"Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 8oz, 807.
71Id. at 8o8.
"Planter's Mercantile Co. v. Armour Packing Co.; Seventh Nat. Bank v. Cook; Pratt
v. Foote, all supra note 42.
"'Stone v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 145 S. C. i66, i43 S. E. 27 (1928); Briggs v.
Central Nat. Bank, 89 N. Y. 382 (1882). See also Wallace, supra note 42, at 802 and 806;
Note (i93I) 4o YALE L. J. 8o2, 8o9, n. 29.
'"Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N. E. 670 (903) ; Mar-
land Refining Co. v. Penn Soo Oil Co., 54 S. D. 0, 222 N. W. 594 (1928); Wells Oil Co. v.
Marcus Oil & Supply Co., 206 Iowa iota, 221 N. W. 547 (3928).
"Death of the drawer revokes the bank's authority to pay the check. Johnston v.
Thomas, 93 Fla. 67, 111 So. 543 (1927) ; Sneider v. Bank of Italy, 184 Cal. 595, 194 Pac. io2i
(i92i) ; i MORSE, op. cit. supra note i5, at § 400; Turner, supra note 36, at 481.
7§ 7.
'1 Turner, supra note 36, at 479.
LEGISLATION
depositor unnecessarily. It would be preferable to provide, as does the Act, that
payment takes place immediately upon the occurrence of any of the acts men-
tioned above.8 '
The determination of when payment occurs is further complicated by the
prc;ision of the Code 8 2 giving the collecting bank the option, in case the re-
mittance draft given in payment of the original item is not honored, to treat
the original item as dishonored; in which case recourse may be had against
prior parties. This is patently inconsistent with the Negotiable Instrunwnts
Law which discharges parties secondarily liable upon payment of the instru-
ment.8 3 A revival of liability after payment has been deemed made is an un-
warranted alteration of the Negotiable Instrwmrents Law.
In general, a major criticism of both enactments is the undue emphasis
placed upon banking convenience to the prejudice of the customer's interest.
As has been shown, it would be comparatively simple to safeguard the cus-
tomer without subjecting the banks and their general creditors to unreasonable
burdens. A more serious criticism might well be that the concurrent promulga-
tion of two enactments, differing in their provisions, each designed to secure
a uniformity in the law of bank collections, defeats the desired end. It is
urged that the proponents of both unite their activities and agree upon the
form such legislation should assume. Only then will uniformity be possible.
M.M.Y.
See§ 15 of the Act which provides that payment may occur upon:
. (i) Receipt by the payor of any agreed equivalent as payment of the item;
(z) The item being charged against the drawer's account, although the charge may
create an overdraft; or
(3) Credit being given or remittance being made for the item according to authority."
I § 1.INEGoTiABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 119 ().
